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Recently, there has been a worsening of the fiscal and current account positions of several 
economies worldwide be it developed or developing one. The persistent behaviour of such 
imbalances has become a pain in the neck of policy makers as these excessive current account 
deficits have often resulted in a long-run insolvency of most of these economies.  
The current account is one of the main indicators of external imbalance of global economics, 
especially when one considers the economies of countries like the United States. Several 
economists in attempt to fully understand the possible causes of the recent global financial and 
economic crisis of 2007-2009, have examined several indicators including a possible 
contribution of global imbalances towards the spread of the crisis.  
The Euro Area (EA) crisis highlighted the need to improve macroeconomic surveillance in 
the European Union not only with regard to the nature of macroeconomic imbalances but also 
with regard to institutional framework (Afonso et. al, 2018). These reasons have rekindled the 
debate and in essence called for the need to re-look at the relationship between the fiscal 
imbalance and current account imbalances, which is often referred to in the literature as the 
“Twin deficits hypothesis (TDH)”. 
The “TDH” postulate that an increase (decrease) in the fiscal balance, otherwise known as 
the budget balance causes an increase (decrease) in the current account balance respectively. 
Higher amounts of deficits may render the general government insolvent and thereby crippling 
its ability to stabilize the public debt and settle those debts when due. Therefore, quite a number 
of countries have attempted to consider the extent to which fiscal adjustments programs can 
help resolve such imbalances. This has been the case of several European economics such as 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  
In view of the fact that the linkage between the fiscal balance and the current account 
balance could be explained by a number of mechanisms, there is still a considerable controversy 
among several economist, with conflicting results arising from different econometric 
methodologies and techniques. The sign and the size of the effect of the budget balance changes 
on the external accounts vary substantially across studies (Afonso et al., 2018).  Interestingly, 
there is still no consensus on the issue of whether the fiscal balance causes the current account 
balance or vice versa. More importantly, the issue of causality has been the central point of the 
debate over the last decade. During the 1980s and 90s, the “twin deficit hypothesis” initially 
proposed to explain the large or growing current account deficits of the United States, was 
generally seen as invalid proposition as a result of the lack of empirical evidence suggesting a 
one-to-one association between the fiscal balance and the current account balance. Studies that 
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have examined this linkage among other factors have supported this claim and have argued that 
even in cases where such a linkage was statistically significant, the association was considerably 
less than one-to-one relationship (Corsetti and Muller, 2006; Normadin, 1999). 
Most recent studies of the linkage between these two balances (imbalances) broadly agree 
that there is a close nexus between the fiscal balance and current account balance and that 
causality runs from the fiscal balance to the current account balance, as implied by most 
standard macroeconomics models such as the Mundell-Fleming model and the Keynesian 
absorption theory.  
Moreover, these studies have pointed out that such a relationship differs in the short-run 
and in the long-run (Normadin, 1999). Further studies such as Kim and Roubini (2008), provide 
evidence that higher budget deficits in the United Sates have rather lowered its external deficits, 
hence, suggesting a “twin divergence”, when the endogenous movements of the fiscal and 
current account deficit are considered. In view of such mixed findings produced by several 
econometric techniques and methodological approaches of previous empirical studies on this 
subject, there isn’t any consensus among economist on the causal nexus between the fiscal 
balance and the current account balance. 
Although, there are several studies on this topic, they seem not to tell a full story.  Therefore, 
we propose to fill such a gap and adopts a holistic approach in understanding the linkage 
between the fiscal balance and the current account balance. The empirical investigation is 
conducted using a number of econometrics techniques such as panel cointegration analysis, 
panel regressions, panel VAR and a panel Granger causality test on a quarterly dataset for 18 
countries (European and OECD countries) for the period of 1995Q1 to 2018Q1. This study is 
close to a recent study by Abass et al. (2011). 
The findings yielded estimated coefficients of around 0.1-0.3, on average, in the panel 
regressions and panel VAR. These results suggest that there is a linkage between the fiscal 
balance and the current account balance, but the association is far less than one-to-one. The 
impact of the real exchange rate appears insignificant. The Granger’s causality test indicates a 
bi-directional causality. These results are in line with other findings in the literature regarding 
the TDH, which will be discussed in the empirical review. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related 
literature. Section three presents the theoretical framework. Section three presents the 
theoretical framework. Section four describes the econometric strategy and the data set. Section 





On the empirical front, a vast number of studies in empirical macroeconomics have used 
several methods such as cointegration analysis, ordinary least squares regression analysis 
(OLS), Granger causality tests, and VAR estimations among others to study the causal nexus 
between the fiscal balance and the current account balance. Amid these, the most widely used 
method in the literature in examining the linkage between the FB and CA balance is 
cointegration analysis (Bacham, 1992). Evidence from the majority of such studies suggest that 
an increase in the FD worsens the CA balance. Earlier work, such as Bernheim (1987), and 
Holtham and Hooper (1988), used single equation models and found evidence that supports the 
TDH. 
Khalid and Guan (1998), using a sample of five developed and five developing countries, 
found evidence of no cointegration between the fiscal balance and the current account balance 
in developed countries, but a non-rejection of such a long-run relationship in developing 
countries. They also found different results from the causality test.  
Since different econometric methods and datasets have yielded mixed results, researchers 
of the last few years have used more advanced techniques in examining the relationship between 
these two balances (imbalances). Recent studies using cointegration analysis have tried to 
account for the existence of structural breaks in order to more accurately identify the long-run 
relationship between the FB and the CA (Bagnai, 2006). There has also been an inclusion of 
other factors such as the real effective exchange rate (REER) in the cointegration specification 
(see Afonso and Rault, 2009) in order to properly account for the effect of REER on the 
association between FB and CA.  
Studies that have used panel regressions are relatively small and such studies have mostly 
produced coefficients of between 0.1-0.7 percent of GDP. Mohammadi (2004) finds, for a 
sample of 63 countries that a one-percent of GDP increase in government spending leads to the 
worsening of the current account by 0.3-0.43 percent of GDP if the spending is tax-financed, 
and by 0.4-0.72 percent of GDP if bond financed. Kennedy and Slok (2005) also find, for a 
sample of 14 OECD countries, that for a one-percent increase in the government budget 
balance, the current account improves by about 0.3 percent of GDP, once indicators of structural 
policies are included. Moreover, that the impact of the real effective exchange rate on such an 
association is marginal.  
Recent studies that used VAR models such as Kim and Roubini (2004) found evidence to 
support the TDH hypothesis. Enders and Lee (1990) used VAR models but found no significant 
association between the FD and the CAD. Beetsma et al (2007), Corsetti and Muller (2006), all 
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reported a negative relationship between the FB and the CA balance. Monacelli and Perotti 
(2007), Kim and Roubini (2008), Abbas et al. (2011), which used a VAR method of estimation, 
all resorted to using the log of real government consumption or expenditure, as such a measure 
is the least impacted measure by the changes in gross domestic product (GDP) in comparison 
to other measures. Abbas et al. (2011), reported an estimated coefficient ranging between 0.3-
0.5 percent of GDP. 
Hence, even for similar methodologies and techniques, the results and conclusions are 
generally mixed. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The causal nexus between the fiscal imbalance and the current account imbalance can 
generally be exemplified by the following well-known identities in Eq. (2), (which relates the 
current account balance (X(ε)-M(ε)) to the fiscal balance (T-G) through the difference between 
private saving and investment) obtained after rearranging Eq. (1): 
 (1)   =  +  +  + 	 − , 
 (2)  = 	 − ,  =  −  −  −  =  − . 
where  is the current account, 	 is the export of goods and services (decreasing in the 
real exchange rate, ε, where a higher ε denotes an appreciation),  is the import of goods 
and services (increasing in ε and in national income, ),  is private consumption,  is public 
consumption and  and  are savings and investment respectively. The relation in Equation 
(2) generally suggest that the current account () is directly related to the savings () and 
investments () in the economy, hence, policies promoting investment have an adverse effect 
on the CA, whiles policies that seeks to reduce private and public consumption have a positive 
impact on the CA, as they tend to increase national savings.  
Equation (2) could be further decomposed into Equation (3) below, to distinguish between 
private and public savings: 
(3)  = 	 − ,  =  −  −  +  −  −  =  −  +  − . 
In Equation (3),   and   are government savings and investment respectively, such that  
 −  corresponds to the fiscal balance (if there are no government transfers to the private 
sector), and is equivalent to the difference between tax revenue,, and expenditures, . 
Similarly,  and  are private savings and investment such that  −  corresponds to 
income less taxes (disposable income − ) and private consumption. Equation (3) 
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shows that if private savings,  is roughly equal to private investment,, then the external 
account and the fiscal balance are interrelated.  
 The argument often presented is that the fiscal balance and the external balance are 
somewhat positively and strongly related and have become widely known as the ‘‘twin deficit 
hypothesis (TDH)’’. Theoretically, there are four possible mechanisms that could explain the 
causal relationship between the fiscal balance (FB) and the current account balance (CA) as 
described by equation (3).  
 The first mechanism which is in accordance with most standard macroeconomic models 
(such as Keynesian absorption theory and the Mundell-Fleming model) postulates that an 
increase in the fiscal deficit, should have an adverse effect on the current account balance. Thus, 
in a Mundell-Fleming Framework, with a flexible exchange rate regime, an increase in the fiscal 
deficit leads to an increase in aggregate demand and an increase in the real domestic interest 
rate. Depending on the degree of openness of the economy in question, such higher interest 
rates attracts foreign capital and causes an appreciation of the domestic currency, resulting in a 
deterioration of the current account balance (Salvatore, 2006; Trachanas & Katrakilidis, 2013; 
Xie & Chen, 2014). Under a fixed exchange rate regime, a fiscal boost generates a higher real 
income and prices, and this deteriorates the current account balance (Anoruo & Ramchander, 
1998). The argument of the Keynesian absorption theory is that an increase in the fiscal deficit 
(FD) would induce a domestic absorption (an expansion of aggregate demand) which could 
lead to an import expansion thereby worsening the current account deficit (CAD) (Darrat, 1988; 
Normaddin, 1999; Hatemi & Sukur, 2002; Ahmad et al., 2015). Hence, this first mechanism 
suggests a causal relationship that runs from the fiscal deficit to the current account deficit.  
 However, contrary to the first mechanism where causality runs from the FD to the CAD, 
the second mechanism known in the literature as the current account targeting hypothesis 
(CATH) suggests a reverse causality nexus, which runs from the CAD to the FD. The argument 
is that the authorities of a country may use fiscal policy to adjust its external position. This 
happens when a deterioration in the CAD results in diminished economic growth, which 
subsequently leads to a deterioration in the fiscal balance. In this case, the authorities are said 
to be, in the words of Summers (1988), “targeting the current account deficit”. 
 The third mechanism suggests that the causal nexus between the fiscal deficit and the 
current account deficit is somehow related to the degree of international capital mobility and to 
the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle (see Marinheiro, 2008).  If savings and investment are not 
strongly correlated, thus reflecting high capital mobility, then the FD and the CAD are expected 
to co-move. Afonso and Rault (2009) stressed this argument that for the TDH to hold, savings 
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and investments should not be strongly correlated, implying that increases in private savings 
may not be sufficient to offset the effects of increased fiscal deficits. Therefore, this mechanism 
suggests a bi-directional causality that could run from the FD to the CAD, and vice versa.  
 Finally, contrary to the already discussed traditional Keynesian viewpoint is a 
mechanism known as ‘‘the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH)’’ of Barro (1974, 1989). 
Models of such hypothesis suggest that an exogenous increase in the fiscal deficit will be 
matched by an instantaneous equal increase in private savings, rather than an increase in net 
foreign borrowing. Thus, consumers perceive an increase in the fiscal deficits as the 
postponement of higher taxes to the future. Therefore, on a given expenditure path, the 
substitution of debt for taxes has no effect on aggregate demand nor on interest rates. This 
hypothesis unlike the previous three discussed mechanisms argues that the fiscal deficit and the 
current account deficit are not causally related. Therefore, the REH predicts a neutral or no 
causal relationship between the fiscal and current account deficit. 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY, DATA AND MODEL SELECTION 
4.1. Econometric methodology 
In the empirical assessment, we conduct a cross-sectional dependence (CSD) test for the 
panel. The results from the CSD test serve as a guide in choosing the appropriate panel unit root 
test (PURT). If evidence is found for the existence of CSD, then “second generation” PURT 
are employed in testing for the integrated properties of the series in the panel. These two tests 
(CSD and PURT) are used as the basis for conducting the various estimations. 
The econometric approach used in this paper includes four types of assessment. The first 
category examines the long-run relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account 
balance through the use of a cointegration analysis. Testing for the existence of co-integration 
among economic variables is an increasingly popular approach to studying long-run economic 
interrelationships. The literature mostly has used the following linear models in testing the 
validity of the twin deficits hypothesis in a panel framework: 
 (4) , =  + , + ,,         
where the index i (i =1,…, N) denotes the country, the index t (t =1,…,T) indicates the period. 
The specification in equation (4) above means that we can test for the existence of a long-run 
relationship by assessing the possible effects of the fiscal balance on the current account 
balance.  
Also, an augmented specification of equation (4) (as in Afonso and Rault, 2013) to capture 
the effect of the real effective exchange rate (REER) is assessed in the following framework: 
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 (5) , =  + , + , + ,. 
As already discussed in the literature review, the real effective exchange rate could have a 
positive or negative impact on the current account balance, hence, its presence in the 
cointegration analysis cannot be discounted. Although, additional factors such as the degree of 
trade and financial openness of the economy, exchange rate regime could have an impact on 
the current account, the main idea here is to concentrate on the FB and on the CA balance. In 
this study, both equations (4) and (5) were assessed using Westerlund (2007) cointegration test 
and the coefficients were estimated using the Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects mean 
group estimator (CCE-MG). The CCE-MG method was chosen as it allows for cross-section 
dependence which is required in this particular case according to the results of the CSD test. 
Moreover, the CCE-MG accounts for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (Eberhardt and 
Presbitero, 2010).  
Secondly, we examine the impact of fiscal balances on the current account balance using 
panel regressions for 18 OECD countries. The two main variables used in the cointegration 
analysis (current account balance as percentage of GDP and fiscal balance (net 
lending/borrowing as a percentage of GDP)) were again used in the panel regressions. A third 
variable, the real effective exchange was also included, and further estimations were done in 
similar manner as in equations (4) and (5). The pooled OLS method, also known as the common 
constant method suggests that there are no differences between the estimated cross-sections 
(N=18), and its only useful under the hypothesis that the data set is a priori homogeneous, 
which is not the case in this study.  
Therefore, to address this problem of heterogeneity bias, fixed effects (FE) could be used 
since they capture all effects that are specific to a particular country and vary overtime. A 
second method that could be used in dealing with unobserved effects in panel data, is the 
random effects (RE) method, which handles the constant for each cross section as random 
parameters.  
After estimating the equations with the pooled OLS methods, fixed effects method and then, 
the random effects method, the Hausman test is conducted to identify the most appropriate 
method among the fixed and the random effect estimators. The dynamic model built is the 
following one: 
(6) , =  +  +  , +  , + ! ",# + $% + % + &, +
&, + !&",# '(&)* + ,, 
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where ,,  denotes the current account balance (% of GDP), ,, denotes the fiscal balance 
(% of GDP), ,, refers to the real effective exchange rate, and ",# , denotes the lagged 
current account (% of GDP). (&)*  is a crisis dummy taking the value of one in the period after 
the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and  and % are the country specific 
fixed effects.  
The third approach used in our empirical analysis is a panel vector autoregressive model 
(VAR) in order to understand the dynamic impact of the FB on the CA balance. Due to the 
difficulty encountered by previous studies in the identification of the exogenous fiscal shocks 
in order to accurately estimate the impact of FB on the CA, recent empirical studies (Monacelli 
and Perotti, 2007; Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2010) in an attempt to deal with the endogeneity 
problem have used government consumption (as a proxy to the fiscal balance), as this variable 
is less likely to react to changes in output. In view of this, an investigation is conducted using 
a VAR model that comprised of the following variables as described in Table 1. 
[Table 1] 
The variables in Table 1 are in accordance with the manner in which recent studies have 
estimated the VAR, with the ordering of the variables given in model A. In contrast to recent 
studies, the variables in model B includes the fiscal balance (FB) instead of the real government 
consumption (RGC), since the main idea in this study is to focus on the linkage between the 
fiscal balance (FB) and the current account balance (CA), and the ordering of the variables is 
as in Model B. The VAR specification is in line with the one used by Beetsma, Giuliodori, and 
Klaasen (2007), Corsetti and Muller (2006), Monacelii and Perotti (2007), and Abbas et al. 
(2011), with the description of the endogenous variables in Table 1. The identification scheme 
is based on a Cholesky decomposition with the following ordering of the variables: 
• Model A: [RGDP RGC CA RIR REER].  
• Model B: [RGDP FB CA RIR REER].  
 Each variable in the model is allowed to react contemporaneously with other variables. The 
ordering of the last two variables in both model one and two are irrelevant as this study is 
interested in analyzing shocks to the fiscal balance and real government consumption. The 
implied assumption is that government consumption responds to other variables with a delay 
of one quarter, hence, the inclusion of the log of real government consumption. The RGDP is 
included to control for the cyclical component of the fiscal balance. The real interest rate (RIR) 




The model in its structural form is the following: 
(7) + =  +# + &+#& + , 
where + denotes the endogenous variables described in Table 1,  is a vector of mutually 
uncorrelated innovations and  are the coefficient matrices. The reduced form is then: 
(8) , =   +   ,# +  &-# + . , 
(9) - = & + & ,# + &&-# + .&, 
with the error terms .  and .& obtained as follows (both are white-noise processes): 
(10) .  = / +  &0 /1 −  &&  , 
(11) .& = 0 + & //1 −  && . 
The results of the VAR model are presented in the form of the dynamic impulse response 
of the other three variables to an increase in either the log of real government consumption or 
the fiscal balance. 
The last approach adopted in this study is the Granger (1969) causality tests for fiscal 
balance and the current account balance. The test was carried on the basis of the following four 
hypothesis: 
i) FB Granger cause the CA. 
ii) CA Granger cause the FB. 
iii) Bi-directional causality. 
iv) CA and FB are independent. 
The conventional Granger causality test involves running the following two regressions 
(with the null hypothesis: - does not Granger cause ,): 
(12) , = ∑ 45 ,# + ∑ 6"7"5 -# + ., 
(13) , = ∑ ,# + .47 , 
where in this particular study  - represents the FB and , represents the CA balance. 
4.2. Data, Variable Description and Stylized Facts 
The data used in this study were collected from a number of databases including OECD 
database, Eurostat, FRED, and IMF database and are of quarterly frequency, covering the 
period 1995Q1-2018Q1 for 18 OECD countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (OST), Belgium 
(BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), 
Greece (GRE), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands (NED), Portugal 
(POR), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), United Kingdom (UKA), and the United States (USA). 
These countries were selected in order to construct a panel that possesses different 
characteristics or time series properties. There are many advantages of using panel data and is 
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considered to be a very efficient analytical method for empirical work. Panel data allow for 
more information, more variability, less collinearity, more degrees of freedom and efficiency 
(Balgati, 2005). The choice of quarterly data over annual data is to appropriately capture the 
timely response of fiscal balance and government consumption to changes in output.  
The variables under consideration are the current account balance (CA) as a percentage of 
GDP, the fiscal balance (FB) as a percentage of GDP, the real gross domestic product (RGDP), 
the real government consumption (RGC), real interest rates (RIR), and real effective exchange 
rate (REER), for all the 18 countries over the examined period. The fiscal balance (FB) and the 
current account balance (CA) are the two main variables used for the panel regressions, panel 
cointegration and Granger causality test, with the inclusion of REER when desired. The 
variables used for the panel VAR are the current account (CA) as a percentage of GDP, the log 
of real gross domestic product (RGDP), log of real government consumption (RGC) or the 
fiscal balance (FB), real interest rate (RIR) and the log of real effective exchange rate (REER).  
All the variables used were obtained as seasonally adjusted variables from their source. The 
RGDP variable was constructed using the nominal GDP and the GDP deflator for each country. 
RGC was constructed using the private consumption deflator. The RIR is the short-term 
nominal interest rate adjusted for by the inflation rate for each particular country. The REER 
was obtained directly from their sources. A detailed descriptive statistic (individual and 
common samples) as well as the correlation among the variables can be found in Appendix 1. 
It could be noticed that the correlation between the fiscal balance (FB) and current account 
balance (CA) is around 0.4 for the entire panel, which is somehow moderate. An inspection of 
the charts (in Appendix A) of the fiscal balance (FB), current account balance (CA) and the real 
exchange rate provides more highlights about some of the stylized facts as known in the 
literature regarding the linkage between these variables. From those graphs, one could identify 
not just the frequency but also a parallel movement of the deteriorations (improvements) in the 
current account balance and the fiscal balance, as well as the impact on the real effective 
exchange rate. 
4.3. Cross-Sectional Dependence Test (CSD) 
Testing for the cross-sectional dependence is crucial in the choice of the appropriate 
estimators (Bai and Kao, 2006). Most “first generation” test assume cross-section 
independence, therefore, as some sort of a robustness check, the Pesaran (2004) test for error 
cross-sectional dependence (() is employed. The ( test is based on an average of pairwise 
correlation coefficient of OLS residuals from individual regressions (Pesaran, 2012). ( 
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works with unbalanced panel as is the case for our study, and more importantly, is robust to 
single and multiple structural breaks in the slope coefficients and the error variances of the 
individual regressions. The test estimates N*(N-1) correlations between countries i=1, and all 
other countries, N-1 (N=18 in this case). The ( statistic is calculated as follows: 
(14) (= 8 &9::#  (∑ ∑ ;<":"5=  :# 5 . 
The results of the test are depicted in Table 2, and indicate that the null hypothesis of cross-
sectional independencies is rejected for most series in the panel, with a moderate correlation 
coefficient. 
[Table 2] 
4.4. Panel Unit Root Test 
With the CSD test result indicating the presence of cross-sectional dependence, there is a 
high tendency for the “first generation” PURT to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. In 
view of this, a “second generation” PURT, Pesaran (2007) is applied (results of the 1st 
generation test, Maddala and Wu, (1999) are available on request). This test is based on the 
mean of the individual ADF t-statistics of each unit in the panel and is able to eliminate the 
presence of cross-section dependence by augmenting the ADF regressions with the lagged 
cross-sectional mean and its first differences of the individual series to capture CSD by a single 
factor model. The test allows for heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficients of the Dicky-
Fuller regressions and allows for the presence of single unobserved common factor with 
heterogenous factor loadings in the data. The result of this test is likely to be influenced by the 
chosen number of lag length, therefore, the ideal lag length is selected for using the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). Moreover, results are shown for the lag bandwidth 0-4.  
The tests are estimated both in levels and first differences, with and without a trend 
respectively. The test produced mixed results among all the variables under consideration, with 
four (CA, FB, REER, RIR) out of the six-variable series (CA, FB, REER, RIR, RGDP, RGC) 
being stationary in levels and in first differences, with and without trend. The other variables 
were stationary in their first differences. The PURT results are quite sensitive to the number of 
lags chosen. However, all the series were found to be stationary when they were considered in 
their first difference, hence, they could be described in general as integrated of order one, I (1). 





5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1. Cointegration Results 
Regarding the cointegration analysis, the Westerlund (2007) error correction based 
cointegration rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% significance level in 
each of the specification (restricted and unrestricted case, with a constant, and with a constant 
and a trend respectively) even in cases where the short-run dynamics were held fixed. Similar 
results were obtained when the robust p-values were considered. The cointegration test results 
are shown Table 4. The result of the test of no cointegration, with the inclusion of the real 
effective exchange rate (as indicated by equation (6)) was not different from the first result, 
conducted on the basis of equation (4). These results provide a clear evidence that the fiscal 
balance and the current are cointegrated, and as such, they have a long-run relationship.  
[Table 4] 
With evidence from the cointegration result suggesting long-run relation between the FB 
and CA, the magnitude of the coefficient was estimated using the Cross Correlated Effects and 
the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCE-MG) estimation procedures developed by 
Pesaran (2006). The results from Table 5 indicate a cointegration coefficient of 0.20 when 
estimation was done on the basis of equation (4). The result didn’t change much (coefficient of 
0.24) when the real effective exchange rate was included as in equation (5). These results 
provide evidence that a long-run relationship exists but it is small in terms of magnitude. 
[Table 5] 
5.2. Granger Causality Test 
The results of the Granger causality test depicted in Table 6 suggest a bi-directional 
causality from both FB and CA, irrespective of the number of lags chosen. This result implies 
that these two balances could be linked either through the first mechanism, thus a Keynesian 
hypothesis or via the third mechanism as discussed in the earlier in the paper. In this case it is 
not sufficient for the government to cut the budget deficit in order to decrease the current 
account deficit (Kalou and Paleologou, 2012). Hence, other policy actions such as exchange 
rate and interest rate policy, and export promotion policies would be needed. 
[Table 6] 
5.3. Panel Regression Results 
The result of the Hausman test (Tables 7, 8) under the null hypothesis that “the random effect 
method is appropriate”, indicated that the fixed effect method is the appropriate method of 
estimation, hence, the panel regressions were conducted using fixed effect method. Estimations 
were done using traditional panel data models and a dynamic model characterized by the 
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presence of a lagged current account (% of GDP) variable among the regressors. Also included 
in the model is a constant term, a year dummy and country fixed effects1. 
[Table 7] 
[Table 8] 
Tables 7 and 8 provide an overview of different estimated regression results of the current 
account on the fiscal balance. The findings indicate an estimated regression’s coefficient 
ranging from 0.15 to 0.65 percent points of GDP. The regression results obtained using fixed 
effects indicate that, on average, a strengthening in the fiscal balance (% of GDP) of one 
percentage point is associated with about 0.29 percentage point improvement in the current 
account (% of GDP). The inclusion of a lagged current account and a year dummy (both 
statistically significant at 1%) resulted in a coefficient of 0.15 percentage point. This indicates 
effect of the crisis period on the relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance. 
Thus, the crisis period minimized the exposure of the current account to the fiscal balance. The 
estimation results also suggest that an appreciation in the exchange rate leads to a deterioration 
in the current account of about 0.04 percentage point, and this is statistically significant at one 
percent level. 
5.4. Panel Var Results 
The results of the Var model are analysed in the form of impulse response functions and 
variance decompositions for both model A (shock to real government consumption) and model 
B (shock to fiscal balances). 
i) Model A 
The impulse responses (Figure 1) for the panel of 18 countries indicates that following a 
unit shock to real government consumption, the CA deteriorates in the 1st quarter and gradually 
increases after the 2nd quarter. The RIR falls significantly till the 3rd quarter where it rises and 
then again retreat in the 4th quarter. Additionally, the REER rises from the first quarter of the 
shock, remains stable till quarter 3, and then takes a downward trend. RGDP is also 
characterized by high fluctuations, initially increasing till quarter 2 where it falls and then rise 
again till quarter 4. The accumulated effects are also shown in Figure 2. The CA deteriorates 
further until the third quarter where it begins to rise, then remains stable from the fourth quarter 
till the fifth quarter and thereafter declines. RIR remains stable in the first and the second 
quarter, then embarks on a continuous decline. The RGDP is seen to be continuously rising 
upon impact of the shock. The REER seems stable on average. These results are somehow 
                                                 
1 The addition of the lagged current account (% of GDP) is able to control for year to year persistence in the 
current account (Abbas et al., 2011).  
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consistent with the findings of Abass et al. (2011), where the so called “Twin Deficit 
Hypothesis” is confirmed, though there are differences in the duration. 
 
FIGURE 1 – Impulse Responses of RGDP, CA, RIR, REER to one-unit shock to RGC.  
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ii) Variance decomposition of Model A 
Appendix Table B1 provides the results of the forecast error variance in percentages, for 
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innovation to all the endogenous variables. With respect to the main variable under 
consideration in this study (CA), about 99% of the forecast error variance is explained by the 
variable itself (CA), gradually decreasing to 93% in the 4th quarter and beyond. Shocks to the 
RGC accounts for 0.2 to 0.6% of the variation in the CA, in the first and second quarter, 
increasing to about 2% by the 10th quarter. Other variables have strong exogenous (weak 
endogenous) influence on the CA, and this could be as a result of the year to year persistence 
of the current account balance. 
iii) Model B 
When a unit shock is given to the fiscal balance, the impulse responses (Figure 3) also shows 
that the CA declines from the 1st quarter till the 3rd quarter and gradually increases after the 4th 
quarter. The RIR unlike as it was in model A, increases significantly till the 2nd quarter where 
it falls and then picks up again from the 3rd quarter onwards. Moreover, the REER exhibit huge 
fluctuations. It rises from the first quarter of the shock, in a similar manner as in model A, and 
then falls after the second quarter. RGDP is also characterized by huge fluctuations as was the 
case in Model A. The accumulated effects are shown in Figure 4. The results indicate that upon 
impact of the shock, CA declines till the second quarter, remains stable on the average till the 
fourth quarter, then fluctuates over the rest of the period. There is no impact on RGDP until the 
fourth quarter where it slightly falls and thereafter remains stable on the average. RIR increases 
in the first and the second quarter, then remains stable afterwards till the eight quarter where it 
embarks again on an upward trend. The REER slightly increases and then remains stable on the 
average for the rest of the period. These results, in terms of the response of the CA are somehow 
similar to that of model A, that the so called “Twin Deficit Hypothesis” is confirmed, though 
there are differences in the duration as mentioned earlier.  
 iv) Variance decomposition of Model B 
The results of the forecast error variance in percentages (table III b) for model B aren’t 
much different from that of model A. About 99% of the forecast error variance of the CA is 
explained by the variable itself (CA) in the first two quarters, gradually decreasing to 91% in 
the 8th quarter and beyond. Just as in model A, other variables have strong exogenous (weak 
endogenous) influence on the CA. Shocks to the FB accounts for about 0.3% of the variation 
in the CA, in the first and second quarter, increasing to about 1% by the last two quarters. RGDP 






FIGURE 3 – Impulse Responses of RGDP, CA, RIR, REER to one-unit shock to FB. 
(Model B)  
 
 
FIGURE 4 – Accumulated Responses of RGDP, CA, RIR, REER to one-unit shock to FB. 
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We have studied the linkage between the fiscal balance (imbalance) and the current account 
balance (imbalance) for a panel of 18 countries, 15 European countries and 3 OECD countries, 
using quarterly data from 1995Q1 to 2018Q1. In the empirical assessment we used panel 
estimation methods such as panel cointegration, panel Granger causality test, panel regressions, 
and the panel VAR methods were employed.  
According to our results, we found that there is a long-run relationship between the fiscal 
balance and the current account balance. However, such an association was found to be not too 
strong. Thus, the findings from the panel regressions and from the Panel VAR suggest that a 
fiscal expansion (proxied by an increase in the log of real government consumption) generally 
leads to a deterioration in the current account balance by 0.2 percentage point of GDP.  On the 
other hand, an improvement in the fiscal balance of one percentage point is associated with 
about 0.3 percentage point improvement in the current account 
The results of this study also showed that the there is a bi-directional causality between the 
fiscal balance and the current account balance, indicating that savings and investments for this 
panel of countries may not highly correlated. This means that the linkage between the fiscal 
balance and current account balance could be explained by the third mechanism discussed 
previously in the paper. Moreover, the behaviour of the real interest rate, thus, rising 
significantly after a unit shock to the fiscal balance as shown in figure 2 (Model B), seems to 
provide evidence in support of the thirds mechanism, that the simple open economy model of 
Mundell (1963) uses in generating the “Twin Deficit Hypothesis”. 
We also examined the role of exchange rate in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks to 
the current account balance. However, this variable did not have a significant impact on the 
results, indicating a weak exchange rate channel. The inclusion of the real interest rate to 
account for monetary policy shocks also did not uncover any significant impact for the results. 
Finally, we have found evidence supporting  the “Twin deficit hypothesis”, which is 
consistent with the results from previous studies. 
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Table 1. Variables 
 
Variable Description 
RGDP Log of real GDP 
RGC Log of real government consumption 
CA Current Account as a percentage of GDP 
RIR Short-term nominal interest rates adjusted for by inflation 
REER 
Log of real effective exchange rate based on manufacturing 
consumer price index 
 
 
Table 2. Cross Sectional Correlation (Pre-Estimation Test) 
 






CA 3.2 0.003 0.034 0.343 
FB 2.54 0.011 0.029 0.318 
REER (ln) 32.31 0.000 0.271 0.485 
RGDP (ln) 103.23 0.000 0.880 0.880 
RIR 80.44 0.000 0.674 0.676 
RGC (ln) 84.64 0.000 0.715 0.822 
NB: The average and absolute correlation coefficient are reported across N x N-1 pairs of correlation. The 
Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence test is distributed standard normal (CD ~ N (0,1), with the Null 
hypothesis of cross-section independence. 
 
Table 3 (a). Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test with Lag Bandwidth [0, 4] 
 
 Current Account Real Effective Exchange Rate (ln) 
    Without trend With trend Without trend With trend 






in levels 0 -10.876*** 0.000   -12.372*** 0.000   -4.094*** 0.000   -3.719***  0.000    
  1 -5.531***  0.000   -6.950*** 0.000   -3.814*** 0.000   -3.619***  0.000    
  2 -2.690*** 0.004   -3.018***  0.001   -3.293*** 0.000   -3.556***  0.000    
  3 2.266 0.988  4.571 1.000 -2.854*** 0.002   -3.404***  0.000    
  4  0.796  0.787   2.453  0.993   -1.457 0.073   -1.412 0.079   
 in 1st differences 0 -20.498***   0.000  -20.434*** 0.000 -20.496***  0.000   -20.437*** 0.000  
  1 -20.432***   0.000  -20.361***  0.000   -17.712***  0.000   -17.331*** 0.000  
  2 -19.874***   0.000  -19.654***  0.000   -13.982***  0.000   -13.106*** 0.000  
  3 -14.191***   0.000  -13.084***  0.000   -11.109***  0.000   -9.716*** 0.000  
  4 -11.137***   0.000  -9.803***  0.000   -12.802***  0.000   -11.427*** 0.000  










Table 3 (b). Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test with Lag Bandwidth [0, 4] 
  
Real GDP (ln) Real Interest Rate 
Without trend With trend Without trend With trend 
 
lags Zt-bar p-value Zt-bar p-value Zt-bar p-value Zt-bar p-value 
in levels: 0 1.203 0.886 1.823 0.966 -3.156*** 0.001 -1.164 0.122 
 
1 1.657 0.951 2.230 0.987 -6.404*** 0.000 -4.880*** 0.000 
 
2 0.917 0.820 1.650 0.951 -7.173*** 0.000 -5.991*** 0.000 
 
3 0.395 0.654 1.388 0.917 -5.986*** 0.000 -5.121*** 0.000 
 
4 1.181 0.881 2.119 0.983 -2.053*** 0.000 -0.588 0.278 
in 1st Differences: 0 -20.307*** 0.000 -20.131*** 0.000 -19.124*** 0.000 -18.539*** 0.000 
 
1 -16.586*** 0.000 -15.911*** 0.000 -16.797*** 0.000 -15.616*** 0.000 
 
2 -12.915*** 0.000 -11.770*** 0.000 -14.822*** 0.000 -13.173*** 0.000 
 
3 -10.340*** 0.000 -8.730*** 0.000 -17.685*** 0.000 -16.625*** 0.000 
 
4 -7.523*** 0.000 -5.440*** 0.000 -10.927*** 0.000 -9.107*** 0.000 
Note: The null hypothesis: Non-stationarity.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
 
 
Table 3 (c). Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test with Lag Bandwidth [0, 4] 
 
  Real Gov. Consumption Expenditure(ln) 
    Without trend                 With trend   
  lags Zt-bar  p-value  Zt-bar  p-value  
in levels: 0 1.700 0.955 2.594  0.995   
  1 3.173 0.999 4.615 1.000 
  2 3.083 0.999  4.008 1.000 
  3 3.676 1.000 4.391 1.000 
 in 1st Differences: 0 -19.889*** 0.000    -19.839***  0.000   
  1 -18.252*** 0.000    -17.860***  0.000   
  2 -16.879*** 0.000    -16.290***  0.000   
  3 -12.269*** 0.000    -10.933***  0.000   
  4 -9.625*** 0.000    -7.910***  0.000   














Table 3 (d). Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test with Lag Bandwidth [0, 4] 
 
  Fiscal Balance 
Without trend With trend 
  lags Zt-bar  p-value  Zt-bar  p-value  
in levels: 0 -10.970*** 0.000   -12.532***  0.000    
  1 -5.410*** 0.000   -6.791***  0.000    
  2 -2.968***  0.001  -3.551***  0.000    
  3 1.778 0.962   3.670 1.000 
  4 0.562  0.713  1.800  0.964   
 in 1st Differences: 0 -20.498*** 0.000  -20.434*** 0.000  
  1 -20.401*** 0.000  -20.318*** 0.000  
  2 -19.643*** 0.000  -19.218*** 0.000  
  3 -14.847*** 0.000  -13.587*** 0.000  
  4 -11.591*** 0.000  -10.160*** 0.000  



































Table 4. Westerlund (2007) Panel Cointegration Test 
 
MODEL VARIABLES: CA and FB 
  Constant Constant and trend 
  Value Z-value P-value Robust P-Value Value Z-value P-value Robust P-Value 
  Unrestricted (Average AIC selected lag length: 1.56) Unrestricted (Average AIC selected lag length: 
1.39) 
 Gt   -4.062 -10.787   0.000      0.000    -5.041 -13.963  0.000    0.000   
 
Ga   
-44.625 -29.213   0.000      0.000    -63.549 -32.154  0.000    0.000   
 Pt   -20.625 -14.568   0.000    0.0001 -23.761 -16.921  0.000    0.000   
 Pa   -45.979 -39.897   0.000      0.000    -55.485 -32.212  0.000    0.001   
  Fixed Short-run Dynamics Fixed Short-run Dynamics 
 Gt   -4.979 -15.119  0.000     0.000    -5.727 -17.545  0.000  0.000 
 
Ga   
-53.043 -35.773  0.000     0.000    -66.913 -34.253  0.000  0.000 
 Pt   -20.625 -14.568  0.000     0.000    -23.761 -16.921  0.000  0.000 
 Pa   -45.979 -39.897  0.000     0.000    -55.485 -32.212  0.000  0.000 
  MODEL VARIABLES: CA, FB and REER 
 Constant Constant and trend 
  Value Z-value P-value Robust P-Value Value Z-value P-value Robust P-Value 
  Unrestricted (Average AIC selected lag length: 1.56) Unrestricted (Average AIC selected lag length: 
1.39) 
 Gt   -4.760 -12.552  0.000    0.000   -5.292 -13.947 0.000  0.000  
 
Ga   
-52.695 -29.471  0.000    0.000   -66.990 -30.879 0.000  0.000  
 Pt   -23.233 -15.461  0.000    0.000   -24.942 -16.891 0.000  0.000  
 Pa   -52.681 -35.523  0.000    0.000   -59.318 -30.650 0.000  0.000  
  Fixed Short-run Dynamics Fixed Short-run Dynamics 
 Gt   -5.397 -15.490  0.000   0.000  -5.934 -17.183  0.000    0.000   
 
Ga   
-57.747 -32.888  0.000   0.000  -68.575 -31.797  0.000    0.000   
 Pt   -23.233 -15.461  0.000   0.000  -24.942 -16.891  0.000   0.000   



















Table 5 (a). Estimation of Cointegration Coefficient 
Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimator   
Wald chi2(1)   4.34 
Prob > chi2    0.0372 
Number of obs     1,359 
Mean Group type estimation     
CA Coef. Std. Error z  P>|z| [95% Conf.  95% Conf. 
Interval] 
FB  .2085677   .1001211  2.08   0.037  .0123339    .4048014 
_CA  .8957657   .3531424   2.54  0.011  .203619 1.587.912 
_FB   .0258043   .0846863  0.30   0.761   -.1401779    .1917864 
_cons  .9593484  1.063.535  0.90  0.367   -1.125.141 3.043.838 
Root Mean Squared Error (sigma): 2.6994 
Cross-section averaged regressors are marked by the suffix:    _CA, _BB respectively.   
All coefficients present represent averages across groups  





Table 5 (b). Estimation of Cointegration Coefficient 
 





Prob > chi2 0.0406 
Number of obs 1,358 
Mean Group type estimation 
CA Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. 95% Conf. 
Interval] 
FB .2441189 .096441 2.53 0.011 .055098 1.007.327 
REER -.1027841 .1334112 -0.77 0.441 -.3642653 -.0002813 
_CA .9929852 .368058 2.70 0.007 .2716048 .003458 
_FB -.0963406 .0903908 -1.07 0.287 -.2735034 .002059 
_REER .0431855 .2000155 0.22 0.829 -.3488377 -.0005965 
_cons 6.220.446 9.173.248 0.68 0.498 -1.175.879 .6427124 
Root Mean Squared Error (sigma): 2.6994 
Cross-section averaged regressors are marked by the suffix:    _CA, _BB, _REER respectively. 
All coefficients present represent averages across groups 








Table 6. Pairwise Granger Causality Test Results 
(a) 
Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
Sample: 1995Q1-2018Q2 
Lags: 2     
Null hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
Current Account does not Granger cause Budget Balance 1323 252.374 2.E-11 
Budget Balance does not Granger cause Budget Balance   489.097 0.0077 
(b) 
Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
Sample: 1995Q1-2018Q2 
Lags: 4     
Null hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
CA does not Granger cause FB 1287 976.346 9.E-08 
FB does not Granger cause CA   369.056 0.0054 
(c) 
Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
Sample: 1995Q1-2018Q2 
Lags: 8     
Null hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
Current Account does not Granger cause Budget Balance 1215 498.989 4.E-06 


























Table 7 (a). Panel Regression for CA 
 







































































N 1358 1358 1358 1358 1358 1358 
Adj R2 0.1560 0.1932 0.5944 0.6010 0.0443 0.0576 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 
































Table 7 (b).  Hausman Test Results  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
          
Cross-section random   26.335.543 2 0.0000 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
          
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
FB 0.157331 0.168116 0.000004 0.0000 
REER -0.063632 -0.059635 0.000005 0.0634 
          
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1358 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.869.802 1.467.160 4.682.379 0.0000 
FB 0.157331 0.024885 6.322.226 0.0000 
REER -0.063632 0.014705 -4.327.332 0.0000 
  
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.600086     Mean dependent var   0.118626 
Adjusted R-squared 0.594407     S.D. dependent var   5.694.647 
S.E. of regression 3.626.703     Akaike info criterion   5.429.143 
Sum squared resid 17598.68     Schwarz criterion   5.505.929 
Log likelihood -3.666.388     Hannan-Quinn criter.   5.457.891 
F-statistic 1.056.695     Durbin-Watson stat   1.198.946 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       

















Table 8 (a). Panel Regression for CA, dynamic model 
 











































N 1346 1346 1346 
Adj R2 0.606 0.678 0.608 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 




Table 8 (b). Hausman Test Results  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects     
Test Summary 
 
Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 284.028.564 6 0.0000 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
CA(-1) 0.530335 0.828139 0.000420 0.0000 
FB 0.111683 0.128296 0.000213 0.0685 
REER -0.047564 -0.002613 0.000099 0.0000 
CA(-1)*DUMMY -0.227061 -0.228145 0.000168 0.9333 
(FB)*DUMMY 0.042545 0.074369 0.000358 0.0926 
















Table A1. Descriptive Statistics - individual samples 
  
CAB FB REER RGDP RGCE RIR 
 Mean  0.265727 -2.446.098 4.592.525 11,55499 3.686.196  0.614822 
 Median -0.300000 -2.300.000 4.600.061 11,26029 3.900.051  0.376367 
 Maximum 2.210.000 1.100.000 4.885.861 13,86797 8.143.792 6.996.970 
 Minimum -2.100.000 -4.180.000 4.176.435 8,64317 -0.132878 -4.658.885 
 Std. Dev. 5.729.158 4.640.513  0.097557 1,34218 1.656.916 1.907.439 
 Skewness  0.243321 -1.529.347 -0.693066 -0.069886  0.465727  0.483932 
 Kurtosis 3.844.510 1.233.360 6.069.419 1.843.117 3.953.616 2.910.777 
 Jarque-Bera 5.870.314 5.257.711 7.906.802 93,24344 1.230.566 5.782.486 
 Probability 0.000000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum 3.940.727 -3.199.496 7.683.295  19042.62 6.126.458 9.031.738 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  48644.06  28145.41 1.591.315 2.966,980 4.560.060 5.341.060 
 Observations 1483 1308 1673 1648 1662 1469 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics - common samples 
 
  CA FB REER RGDP RGCE RIR 
 Mean -0.046925 -2.542.718 4.596.629 11,49935 3.880.431  0.505327 
 Median -0.900000 -2.400.000 4.601.748 10,98624 3.990.276  0.233027 
 Maximum 2.210.000 1.100.000 4.885.861 13,86797 8.143.792 6.996.970 
 Minimum -2.100.000 -4.180.000 4.176.435 9.000.594  0.251720 -4.658.885 
 Std. Dev. 5.911.416 4.681.296  0.107069 1.363.595 1.718.700 1.887.201 
 Skewness  0.174482 -1.580.118 -0.773718  0.065555  0.546656  0.577607 
 Kurtosis 3.481.397 1.270.774 5.729.189 1.731.733 3.793.066 3.151.999 
 Jarque-Bera 1.772.019 5.224.391 4.933.819 81,48780 9.144.230 6.805.090 
 Probability  0.000142  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum -5.645.102 -3.058.890 5.529.745  13833.71 4.668.158 6.079.084 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  42003.69  26341.27 1.377.950 2.234,99 3.550.623 4.280.958 







Table A3. Correlation among the variables used in the models 
 CA FB REER RGDP RGCE RIR 
CA  1.000      
FB 0.411 1.000     
REER 0.061 0.009 1.000    
RGDP 0.238 0.061 0.260 1.000   
RGCE -0.043 0.006 0.181 0.224 1.000  




FIGURE A1 – The Fiscal balance (FB) and Current account balance (CAB) of 





























































































































































































































































































































































































Table B1. Model A Variance Decomposition (%) 
 
Cholesky Ordering: D_LNRGDP D_FB D_CA D_RIR D_LNREER 




   Period S.E. D_LNRGDP D_LNRGC D_CA D_RIR D_LNREER 
  1 0.008823 100.0.000  0.000000 0.000000  0.000000 0.000000   
(0.00000)  (0.00000) (0.00000)  (0.00000) (0.00000) 
2 0.008952 99.86.579  0.122047 0.005247  0.006752 0.000165   
(0.30199)  (0.22306) (0.10811)  (0.11510) (0.10711) 
D_LNRGDP 4 0.009575 99.08.134  0.563579 0.128380  0.084602 0.142100 
  
  
(0.67746)  (0.48074) (0.30105)  (0.21332) (0.28355) 
8 0.009746 95.95.199  0.876524 1.059.328 1.849.390 0.262768   
-134.753  (0.71273) (0.72522)  (0.81077) (0.36848) 
10 0.009796 95.39.505 1.203.509 1.175.582 1.863.920 0.361935   
-142.370  (0.78508) (0.73785)  (0.80884) (0.41783) 
  1 0.016510 0.258332  0.288210 99.45.346  0.000000 0.000000   
(0.28955)  (0.29979) (0.42164)  (0.00000) (0.00000) 
2 0.017173 0.177990  0.643642 99.14.233  0.018982 0.017061   
(0.19008)  (0.32618) (0.38729)  (0.08559) (0.07461) 
 D_CA 4 0.017235 0.707002 1.018.321 97.37.390  0.602935 0.297843 
  
  
(0.43331)  (0.46188) (0.86375)  (0.52098) (0.38772) 
8 0.018932 3.116.174 1.915.167 93.47.384  0.966562 0.528255   
-121.825  (0.57287) -165.246  (0.68821) (0.56827) 
10 0.021326 2.914.068 2.041.819 93.40.678 1.159.683 0.477654   
-119.374  (0.64461) -168.070  (0.72518) (0.52797) 
  1 2.334.766 0.084188  0.467428 0.129383 99.31.900 0.000000   
(0.21884)  (0.39814) (0.23657)  (0.49933) (0.00000) 
2 3.032.701 0.080551  0.446783 0.315627 97.23.495 1.922.092   
(0.25415)  (0.39377) (0.39811)  (0.91268) (0.71118) 
D_RIR 4 3.076.213 0.324431  0.845395 0.337011 96.45.578 2.037.382 
  
  
(0.39321)  (0.52840) (0.42604) -103.226 (0.76010) 
8 3.394.602 1.199.147 2.590.240 0.372462 93.13.962 2.698.527   
(0.69701)  (0.93736) (0.45850) -142.427 (0.86896) 
10 3.580.678 1.252.257 2.608.603 0.378191 92.96.755 2.793.396   
(0.71516)  (0.92929) (0.47089) -145.483 (0.86981) 
  1 0.542207 0.001335  0.011081 2.33E-05  0.251662 99.73.590   
(0.11575)  (0.13444) (0.10844)  (0.33037) (0.37515) 
2 0.554605 0.034718  0.102667 0.007637  0.501445 99.35.353   
(0.19896)  (0.23049) (0.15913)  (0.49000) (0.57863) 
D_LNREER 4 0.557580 0.257095  0.253708 0.031872  0.578042 98.87.928 
  
  
(0.33338)  (0.33331) (0.23088)  (0.51300) (0.70685) 
8 0.591490 0.780050  0.407550 0.073714 1.495.635 97.24.305   
(0.54615)  (0.42515) (0.29530)  (0.77473) -105.286 
10 0.592399 0.830649  0.489578 0.091914 1.514.669 97.07.319 
    (0.57752)  (0.46395) (0.32376)  (0.77650) -111.520 
36 
 
Table B2. Model B Variance Decomposition (%) 
 
   Period S.E. D_LNRGDP D_FB D_CA D_RIR D_LNREER 
 
1 0.008522 100,0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000   
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
2 0.008849 98.51183 0.137248 1.328.308 0.004625 0.017986   
(0.94711) (0.33678) (0.83812) (0.18228) (0.19425) 
D_LNRGDP 4 0.009639 97.05625 0.126914 2.500.587 0.173272 0.142975    
-142.566 (0.38832) -121.421 (0.41981) (0.40310) 
8 0.009928 93,27862 0.818694 4.183.166 1.465.373 0.254147   
-198.941 (0.86353) -148.452 (0.91042) (0.61257) 
10 0.010028 92.00631 1.635.532 4.121.362 1.848.997 0.387800   
-206.635 -106.563 -150.566 -106.855 (0.71491) 
 
1 2.513.754 0.517354 0.344752 99.137890 0.000000 0.000000   
(0.50839) (0.44449) (0.65059) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
2 3.151.446 1.612.774 0.218603 98.11850 0.003379 0.053396   
-107.757 (0.36149) -116.401 (0.14039) (0.17588) 
D_CA 4 3.203.428 3.054.671 0.462804 95.700560 0.476455 0.305510    
-151.093 (0.62946) -179.240 (0.66722) (0.54489) 
8 3.301.017 5.869.493 0.884842 92.218500 0.670922 0.356243   
-181.096 (0.75276) -216.098 (0.82325) (0.62507) 
10 3.479.461 5.813.636 1.128.990 91.608370 1.066.346 0.382654   
-185.950 (0.92981) -234.202 (0.97034) (0.72367) 
 
1 2.254.831 0.074186 0.650799 0.127315 99.1477 0.000000   
(0.24326) (0.61973) (0.31100) (0.72759) (0.00000) 
2 2.831.973 0.070632 0.671065 0.205250 95.67146 3.381.597   
(0.30969) (0.63136) (0.44730) -165.119 -140.897 
D_RIR 4 2.877.227 2.076.553 0.692117 0.256250 93.29258 3.682.500    
-110.496 (0.67299) (0.54693) -197.150 -150.946 
8 3.230.040 2.604.368 1.229.986 0.421308 90.90361 4.840.732   
-134.140 (0.96751) (0.72193) -234.081 -167.251 
10 3.267.703 3.023.348 1.587.004 0.428814 89.90105 5.059.788   
-140.048 -114.330 (0.76415) -235.690 -168.453 
 
1 0.522548 0.094473 0.147131 2.79E-05 2.654.237 9.710.413   
(0.28483) (0.36288) (0.17000) -116.907 -128.019 
2 0.538822 0.176031 0.140097 0.014211 2.713.569 96.95.609   
(0.41220) (0.38484) (0.25360) -121.085 -137.706 
D_LNREER 4 0.546232 0.194266 0.191842 0.032833 2.915.077 96.66.598    
(0.50162) (0.53013) (0.40782) -124.989 -152.401 
8 0.597800 0.876063 0.451038 0.166497 4.203.379 9.430.302   
(0.83803) (0.68024) (0.62746) -155.466 -204.488 
10 0.602824 0.994145 0.600089 0.197912 4.327.141 93.88.071   
(0.90531) (0.80910) (0.68468) -156.382 -212.530 
 
Cholesky Ordering: D_LNRGDP D_FB D_CA D_RIR D_LNREER 
Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (500 repetitions)  
